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The development of teaching materials for future software engineers is critical to
the long term success of the Grid. At present however there is considerable turmoil
in the Grid community both within the standards and the technology base
underpinning these standards. In this context, it is especially challenging to
develop teaching materials that have some sort of lifetime beyond the next wave of
Grid middleware and standards. In addition, the current way in which Grid
security is supported and delivered has two key problems. Firstly in the case of the
UK e-Science community, scalability issues arise from a central certificate
authority. Secondly, the current security mechanisms used by the Grid community
are not fine grained enough. In this paper we outline how these issues are being
addressed through the development of a Grid Computing module supported by an
advanced authorisation infrastructure at the University of Glasgow.
1. Introduction
Future Grid engineers require training materials
that allow them to understand the way in which
current Grid know-how has been delivered, its
limitations, and importantly to understand how
such middleware can be used to support e-
Science today. We distinguish understanding the
principles and challenges associated with the
development of Grid technology and its general
usage. The former we regard here as education,
whilst the latter can be seen more generally as
training. This distinction is important to make
since the underlying challenges faced by internet
wide heterogeneous distributed systems as
addressed by Grid technology remains
predominantly the same. The way in which
existing software has evolved to meet these
challenges is changing however.
In a similar vein, the distinction between Grid
usage and e-Science more generally should be
made since the borderline between using Grid
middleware and undertaking e-Science is often
blurred. It is clear that what we would like to
achieve is: to educate future computer scientists
to engineer improved Grid middleware and to
educate e-Scientists to use existing middleware
to solve scientific problems. We note here that e-
Science education and training does not
explicitly require or advocate use of Grid
technology. Indeed there are many e-Scientists
currently undertaking their research with
minimal or no Grid infrastructure. In short, the
requirements for education and training differ
depending upon who the target audience is.
At the time of writing, one of the greatest
challenges in delivering materials for educating
and/or training future Grid engineers and e-
Scientists is the fluidity of the technological
landscape. Grid technology and associated
standards are perpetually evolving with new
recommendations and software from standards
bodies and solutions providers. This has been
exemplified in the last year with the move from
Grid infrastructures to Open Grid Service
Infrastructure (OGSI) based Grid services and
the move towards Web Service Resource
Framework (WSRF) web/Grid services. The
evolution of the Open Grid Service Architecture
(OGSA) is also a key issue that makes the
development and delivery of any form of
education or materials difficult. Trainers and
educators need to be sure that they are
developing materials which has some expectancy
of life time. Developing and delivering
educational materials based upon explicit
technology, e.g. Globus toolkit version 3, are
fraught with dangers associated with a moving
technology base.
2. Virtual Organisations and Security
One of the primary motivations for using or
developing Grid middleware today is to
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dynamically link collections of distributed
individuals and resources together to form so
called Virtual Organisations (VOs). Typically a
VO will allow a collection of individuals and or
institutions to pool resources such as data sets,
data archives, CPUs, or allow access to
specialised equipment from astronomical radio-
telescopes through to medical imaging scanners.
With the open and collaborative nature of the
Grid, ensuring that local security constraints are
met and not weakened by Grid security solutions
is paramount. Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs)
represent the most common way in which
security in the Grid is addressed. Through PKIs,
it is possible to validate the identity of a given
user requesting access to a given resource. This
is known as authentication. For example, with
the Globus toolkit [12] solution, gatekeepers are
used to ensure that signed requests are valid, i.e.
from known collaborators. When this is so, i.e.
the Distinguished Name (DN) of the requestor is
in a locally stored and managed gridmap file, the
user is typically given access to the locally set up
account as defined in the gridmap file.
There are several key limitations with this
approach with regard to security however. For
example, the level of granularity of security is
limited. There is no mention of what the user is
allowed to do once they have gained access to
the resource. Further this approach works on the
assumption that user certificates are provided by
an acknowledged certificate authority (CA). In
the UK, a centrally managed CA at Rutherford
Appleton Laboratories exists which
(necessarily!) has strict procedures for how
certificates are allocated. Users are expected to
"prove" who they are in order to get a certificate,
e.g. through presenting their passports to a
trusted individual at their institution. This is a
human intensive activity and one which has
scalability issues once it is rolled out to the wider
community, e.g. to industry and larger groups
such as students taking Grid/e-Science courses.
Having users personally take care of their private
keys is another limitation of this approach.
In short, current experiences with PKIs [13, 14]
as the mechanism for ensuring security on the
Grid have not been too successful [15, 16].
Authorisation infrastructures offer extended and
finer grained security control when accessing
and using Grid resources. Numerous
technological solutions have been put forward
providing various levels of authorisation
capabilities e.g. AKENTI [1], CAS [2],
CARDEA [3], GSI [4], PERMIS [5,6,7] and
VOMS [8,9]. Examples of how these compare to
one another are described in [17, 18, 19]. It is too
early to say if large scale use of attribute
certificates (ACs) for user authorisation, based
on infrastructures such as PERMIS, will be
successful or not. However, few other
alternatives currently exist, so practical
experience is required. In order for large scale
use to be facilitated, dynamic (rather than static)
delegation of authority is required. In the current
PERMIS infrastructure, static delegation of
authority means that a central authority has to be
contacted, and register local managers in its
policy, before managers are entitled to assign
privileges to subordinates. With dynamic
delegation of authority, local managers do not
- need to be registered, but are given the privilege
to delegate when they are first given privileges to
use the system. Managers can then allocate
privileges to staff and students as required,
without having to contact the central authority
first to get permission. Through this, a federated
and scalable model of security authorisation can
be realised. In developing this federated
Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI)
model, key challenges have to be overcome
which are common to most, if not all, uses of
Grid technology - the dynamic establishment of
VOs. VOs allow shared use of computational
and data resources by collaborating institutions.
Establishing a VO will require that efficient
access control mechanisms to the shared
resources by known individuals are in place.
However, currently in the Grid community
access control is usually done by comparing the
authenticated name of an entity to a name in an
Access Control List. This approach lacks
scalability and manageability as discussed in
[15]. Dynamic delegation of privileges offers a
more realistic approach that could shape future
Grid security, especially when it is rolled-out to
the masses, e.g. Grid students, industry.
3. Teaching Principles Underlying the
Grid
In educating the future generation of Grid
engineers, a balance between concepts and
principles associated with Grids and e-Science is
needed. Within the Grid Computing module at
the University of Glasgow, the lecture material
developed has been focused upon the underlying
principles and challenges associated with Grid
technologies. Thus whilst there might be
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numerous technologies say for job scheduling
(Condor, Sun Grid Engine, OpenPBS, Maui, ...),
the basic principles of job scheduling and the
specific challenges of large scale, wide area job
scheduling remain the same. It is worth noting
that the Grid Computing module at Glasgow has
16 full time students registered. This has more
than exceeded initial expectations for a brand
new course and module.
Establishing a course based solely upon basic
principles and challenges associated with Grid
technologies applied to e-Science, is unlikely to
be suitable for a full time advanced course
however. Experiments and investigations using
current state of the art in Grid technology are
needed. At Glasgow this has been through
looking towards Globus toolkit version 3
(amongst other technologies), however, the main
point is that this technology has not provided the
cornerstone of the educational material. Rather it
has provided a vehicle through which many of
the basic principles have been demonstrated. It is
this perspective that underpins the difference
between training and education more generally.
A key requirement on Grid education is a broad
scope and balance. Grid technology touches on
many areas from security, usability, job
scheduling and data management etc and
developing single courses attempting to provide
a complete picture of Grid today needs to be
targeted to the right audience. For example,
whilst high level overviews of Grid can be
provided say to undergraduate students, it is
more likely the case that complete and detailed
overview materials are best delivered to
computer science students that have the
necessary grounding in related materials. At
Glasgow for example, numerous pre-requisites
existed for students to select the Grid Computing
module. For example, students had to be
competent in Java, knowledgeable in internet
technologies, have experience of distributed
algorithms and systems, and done some work on
databases. (As it happened numerous students
did not meet all requirements hence extra lecture
material had to be provided, e.g. on XML based
technologies and standards and web services).
The Grid computing module contents at Glasgow
is given in Table 1.
Here the focus was primarily upon teaching the
principles, concepts and overarching challenges
present in Grids today. For example, the lectures
on security provided an overview of the
challenges of making Grids secure including
concepts such as authentication, authorisation,
accounting, auditing, confidentiality, privacy,
data integrity, and trust. Exploration of current
Grid security mechanisms, e.g. PKI based
authentication and GSI based individual
service/user based authorisation was presented,
with focus on the many open challenges to be
addressed to ensure Grid security is robust and
meets the needs of the different e-Science
communities.
-Week I "Lecture I Introduction to Grid Computing
-Lecture 2 Scalability and Heterogeneity
'Week 2 Tutorial 1 Discussion of seminal Grd papers
eLecture 3 Open standards and architectures
Lecture 4 Implementations of the Grid
S t~~~~architecture
lWeek 3 Lecture 5 W r
6 Resource discovery/information
services
s ; Exploring. web. services
> STutoial2 Exploning web servicesTutorial 2: technologies with GT3
Week 4 ILecture 7 Grid security concepts
-.Lecture 8 Virtual organizations
'Lecture 9 -Security in practise
6.Week 5 Tutorial 3;: zDiscussion of Grid: scurity
spapers/Lab
'Lecture 10 Job scheduling and management
-Lecture 11 Job scheduling and management
Week 6 Tutorial4 'Diusson of jb .scheduling
Lecture 12 Workflow management
ITutorial 5 IQ & A on programming exercise
:fWeek 7 Lecture 13 tData access, integration and,I'management
R Lecture 14 fData provenance and curation
Discussion of datal
Tutorial 6 management/provenance
'Week 8 "Lecture 15 Bulk Data Transfer
ALecture 16 Peer-to-peer communication
Tutorial 7 Discussion of networking papers
Week 9 ILecture 17 tTools for Collaboration
Tutorial 8 Discussion on future of GridComputing
Lecture 18 The future of Grid Computing
Week 10 Lecture 19 Sample applications
"Lecture 20 'Review of major concepts
Tutorial 9 tQ & A
Table 1: Grid Computing module contents
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A key requirement on rolling out any form of
Grid education is to establish the infrastructure
needed for this. This is non-trivial and the effort
involved should not be underestimated. Grid
technology and dependencies between packages
is still a challenge for installation and general
usage. This includes getting students equipped
for working on the Grid, e.g. through X.509
certificates (issued from the UK e-Science
certificate authority at RAL), or as was the case
at Glasgow, establishing a local certificate
authority.
For the Grid computing module at Glasgow, the
following list of software for the Grid
Computing Module was used. This software was
initially built on a single machine and the disk
image duplicated across the training cluster.
* PERMIS Privilege Allocator 1.5+,
PERMIS API 1.3 requires:
o Java SDK 1.4.2+ (includes
JNDI)
o IAIK JCE (contained in
Privelege Allocator 1.5)
* Globus Toolkit 3.3 requires:
o Apache Ant 1.6+
o Junit 3.8.1




* Tomcat 4.1.24+ (with GT3.3)
* JDBC Database (Postgresql)
In addition, a lab server was set up with
OpenLDAP 2.1 for the attribute certificates




In a Grid environment, authentication (being able
to establish the identity of a user) should be
augmented with authorisation capabilities, which
can be considered as what Grid users are allowed
to do on a given Grid end-system. Thus "what
users are allowed to do" can be interpreted as the
privileges that the users have been allocated on
those end-systems. The X.509 standard [20] has
standardised the certificates of a PMI. A PMI can
be considered as being related to authorisation in
'Included in the Linux version used in the lab.
much the same way as a PKI is related to
authentication. Consequently, there are many
similar concepts in PKIs and PMIs. An outline of
these concepts and their relationship are
discussed in detail in [6].
A key concept from PMI are attribute certificates
(ACs) which, in much the same manner as public
key certificates in PKI, maintain a strong binding
between a user's name and one or more privilege
attributes. The entity that digitally signs a public
key certificate is called a Certification Authority(CA) whilst the entity that signs an AC is called
an Attribute Authority (AA). The root of trust of
a PKI is sometimes called the root CA - which
in terms of the UK e-Science community is
given by the Grid Support centre at RAL [21].
The root of trust of the PMI is called the source
of authority (SOA). CAs may have subordinate
CAs whom they trust and to which they delegate
the powers of authentication and certification.
Similarly, SOAs may delegate their power of
authorisation to subordinate AAs. If a user needs
to have their signing key revoked, a CA will
issue a certificate revocation list. Similarly, if a
user needs to have authorisation permissions
revoked, an AA will issue an attribute certificate
revocation list (ACRL). Typically, a given users'
access rights are held as access control lists
(ACLs) within each target resource. In an X.509
PMI, the access rights are held within the
privilege attributes of ACs that are issued to
users. A given privilege attribute within an AC
will describe one or more of the user's access
rights. A target resource will then read a user's
AC to see if they are allowed to perform the
action being requested.
The international standard | ITU-T
recommendation X.812 [22] identifies two key
components to support authorised access to a
target (software/data resource to be protected):
an Access control Enforcement Function (also
known as a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)) and
an Access control Decision Function (also
known as a Policy Decision Point (PDP)). The
PEP ensures that all requests to access the target
are authorised through checking with the PDP.
The PDP's authorisation decision policy is often
represented through collections of rules
(policies), e.g. stored in a Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (LDAP) server.
The different authorisation infrastructures
associated with Grid technology have put
forward their own mechanisms for realising
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PEPs and PDPs. Recently however, the GGF has
put forward a generic API - the SAML AuthZ
API - which in principle provides a generic PEP
that can be associated with an arbitrary
authorisation infrastructure [23]. The Grid
specification is an enhanced profile of the
OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language
v 1.1 [24]. The OASIS SAML specification
defines a number of elements for making
assertions and queries regarding authentication,
authorization decisions and attributes The
OASIS SAML AuthZ specification defines a
message exchange between a PEP and a PDP,
consisting of an AuthorizationDecisionQuery
flowing from the PEP to the PDP, with an
assertion returned containing some number of
AuthorizationDecisionStatements.
The AuthorizationDecisionQuery consists of:
* A Subject element containing a
NameIdentifier specifying the initiator
identity
* A Resource element specifying the
resource to which the request to be
authorized is being made.
* One or more Action elements specifying
the actions being requested on the
resources
Through this SAML AuthZ API, a generic PEP
can be achieved which can be associated with
arbitrary (GT3.3) Grid services. Thus rather than
developers having to explicitly engineer a PEP
on a per application basis, the information
contained within the deployment descriptor file
(.wsdd) when the service is deployed within the
container, is used. Authorisation checks on users
attempting to invoke "methods" associated with
this service are then made using the information
in the .wsdd file and the contents of the LDAP
repository (PDP) together with the DN of the
user themselves. Note that this "method"
authorisation basis extends current security
mechanisms such as GSI which work on a per
service/container basis. This generic solution can
be applied to numerous infrastructures used to
realise PDPs such as PERMIS.
4.1 PERMIS Background
The Privilege and Role Management
Infrastructure Standards Validation (PERMIS)
project [7] was an EC project that built an
authorisation infrastructure to realise a scalable
X.509 AC based PMI. Through PERMIS, an
alternative and more scalable approach to
centrally allocated X.509 public key certificates
can be achieved through the issuance of locally
allocated X.509 ACs.
The PERMIS software realises a Role Based
Access Control (RBAC) authorisation
infrastructure. It offers a standards-based Java
API that allows developers of resource gateways
(gatekeepers) to enquire if a particular access to
a resource should be allowed. The PERMIS
RBAC system uses XML based policies defining
rules, specifying which access control decisions
are to be made for given VO resources. These
rules include definitions of: subjects that can be
assigned roles; SOAs, e.g. local managers trusted
to assign roles to subjects; roles and their
hierarchical relationships; what roles can be
assigned to which subjects by which SOAs;
target resources, and the actions that can be
applied to them; which roles are allowed to
perform which actions on which targets, and the
conditions under which access can be granted to
roles.
Roles are assigned to subjects by issuing them
with X.509 Attribute Certificate(s). A graphical
tool called the Privilege Allocator (PA) has been
developed to support this process. Once roles are
assigned, and policies developed, they are
digitally signed by a manager and stored in one
or more LDAP repositories.
The process to set up and use PERMIS can be
split into two parts: Administration and Use. To
set up and administer PERMIS requires the use
of a LDAP server to store the attribute
certificates and reference the SOA root
certificate. A local CA is required to be set up
using OpenSSL [25] - this designates the SOA
and all user certificates created from this CA
must have a Distinguished Name that matches
the structure of the LDAP server. The DN of the
user certificate is what is used to identify the
client making the call on the grid service.
From the user's perspective, once the
administrator has set up the infrastructure, the
PERMIS service is relatively easy to use. Unique
identifiers are placed as parameters into the
user's grid service deployment descriptor (.wsdd
file). These are the Object Identification (OID)
number of the policy in the repository, the URI
of the LDAP server where the policies are held
and the SOA associated with the policy being
implemented. Once these parameters are input
and the service is deployed, the user creates a
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proxy certificate with the user certificate created
by the local CA to perforn strong authentication.
The client is run and the authorisation process
allows or disallows the intended action.
5. Experiences of Grid Computing
Module
Establishing lectures and associated tutorials
encompassing a broad range of Grid and e-
Science experiences and insight for the first time
is a challenge. To help minimise this difficulty,
the Grid computing module at Glasgow was
developed through a combined effort including
lecturing and tutorial duties (Drs Perkins, Sinnott
and Watt) with invited lectures provided by Prof.
Seamus Ross of the National Digital Curation
Centre and Dr David Ferguson of the EGEE
training team. Dr Watt was largely responsible
for establishing the infrastructure used to explore
Grid technologies and Anthony Stell for
expertise in and deployment of security policies.
The course itself has just completed and students
given positive comments on its content and
delivery.
As part of the course, the students were asked to
develop a policy through the PERMIS Policy
Editor. This policy was then used in the larger
programming assignment. Specifically the policy
was for a GT3.3 service (searchSortGridService)
which wraps a Condor based application (this
service offers two methods to search
(searchMethod) and sort (sortMethod) a large
(5MB) text file (the complete works of
Shakespeare). The students themselves were split
into groups (studentteaml, studentteam2) with
the authorisation policy to ensure that method
sortMethod can only be invoked by members of
their student group and the lecturing staff, and
that method searchMethod can be invoked by
everyone. This set-up was used to illustrate the
use of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC),
where users are allocated privileges based on
what role they have been assigned rather than
their local user credentials.
The output of the Policy Editor is an XML-based
policy (Figure 1) which identifies specific roles
(studentteaml, studentteam2 and lecturer),
specific targets (searchSortGridService) and
specific actions on that target (searchMethod and
sortMethod). This XML policy is then input to
the Privilege Allocator tool which is used to
denote specific users associated with that given
rule (i.e. the students themselves) and to digitally
sign the policy and store it in the LDAP server.
Figure 1: XML based security policy
All of the students were able to successfully
create the policy shown above using the
PERMIS Policy Editor with minimal help from
staff. It should be noted that the students were
informed of various background information that
they would need to create the policy including
the Policy Domain; the Source of Authority to
use; and the Policy Object Identifier for their
student group.
The policy was signed by the administrator of
the LDAP server and input to the SOA node.
Two policies were used; identical in every
respect except for which team could access the
restricted method. The students were split into
two teams with each team having a specific
policy identification number. The students were
requested to critically evaluate the PERMIS tools
for this purpose, with these results being sent
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back to the PERMIS team for HCI
improvements and minor bug fixes, e.g.
problems in cross platform (Unix/Windows)
versions of the tool and functionality in the tool
that has not yet been implemented (although the
buttons/pull down menus exist). This
information has provided the most detailed
exploration of PERMIS to date and is guiding
future work on the PERMIS tools.
The programming assignment that was used to
investigate Grid based solutions was based upon
exploring various performance aspects of
existing Grid middleware. Specifically the
students were to write a Java based application to
perform two operations:
* search a text file (and retrieve the number
of times a certain term occurs);
* sort the text file so that the terms and
number of times they occur is given.
Students were allowed to implement whatever
search/sorting algorithm they wished. Students
were then expected to:
* perform benchmarking on the speed of the
application on a single PC for searching
and sorting the text file;
* extend and parallelise the application to
make use of the training lab Condor pool
and perform benchmarking;
* wrap the parallelised application as a
GT3.3 Grid service and develop a client to
test it and perform benchmarking;
* extend the GT3.3 based parallelised
application so that it uses the previously
developed security policy;
* extend the GT3.3 based parallelised
application so that it supports individual
security restrictions (can user X invoke
searchSortGridService) through GSI.
To allow the students to use the PERMIS
infrastructure, they were issued with their own
individual certificates and keys, generated from a
local CA.
At the time of writing, the student
implementations of this assignment have just
been completed. It is clear that this has proven to
be a challenging assignment with some students
being able to get further than others. It should be
noted that certain students did manage to
complete their assignments. The overall
performance benchmarking of the impact on
distributing a search/sort job across a Condor
pool and delivering this as an authorised Grid
service (using PERMIS) is significant however.
6. Conclusions and Future Plans
The Grid Computing module at Glasgow
University has provided a broad overview of the
key concepts and challenges associated with
Grids. The exploration of these concepts through
existing Grid middleware such as GT3 and
Condor has proven to be a challenge, both for the
educators and the students themselves. It goes
without saying that the existence of a more
mature Grid middleware and associated
standards would have significantly reduced the
overheads in preparing this module and for
flattening the student learning curve.
The lecture material itself has been developed
specifically for advanced Computer Scientists
and hence makes various assumptions on their
backgrounds. The lecture material itself is
available for download (see
http://csperkins.ora/teaching/2004-2005/gc5)
however it has a focus of advanced Grid
education as opposed to general Grid training.
As such, the material is focused on challenges of
Grid technology as opposed to being more
general training material.
This work has also allowed exploration of
advanced authorisation infrastructures. The
existing model of a single central CA for
certificates used in PKI based authentication is
not a scalable one, nor does it meet the
challenges of Grid security. A more realistic
model would be to have local CA infrastructure
to issue certificates, e.g. to students as part of
their matriculation. At Glasgow this has been
relatively straightforward to achieve, however
there are issues in recognition of these
certificates by other CAs, e.g. the UK e-Science
CA since no root of trust exists between these
CAs. Solutions to this problem might be based
upon some form of bridging technologies [26].
Whilst PERMIS and APIs such as the GGF
SAML AuthZ API support a generic Grid based
authorisation mechanism, there are likely to be
scalability issues in such solutions. Thus for
example, the expression of policies of individual
methods on individual services to specific end
users will have immediate maintenance and
performance overheads when such systems are
rolled out to hundreds or thousands of users
accessing and using a multitude of services and
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data sets. The data repository used for such
infrastructures will also need to be enhanced as
currently no tools exist that easily allow its
dynamic maintenance.
Another issue that has been fed back to the
PERMIS team and the wider authorisation
standards community is the ability to have
parameter-level authorisation (as opposed to the
purely method name based authorisation
supported by the SAML AuthZ API). This would
allow for greater flexibility and finer grained
authorisation possibilities.
In conclusion, there is a need for a core set of
Grid and e-Science educational and training
materials, as well as guidelines on how to
establish local infrastructures for teaching
purposes. Whilst as demonstrated here, it is
possible to produce such materials and deploy
the associated infrastructure, this is still
challenging. With the eventual consolidation of
standards and associated technologies, it is
hoped that this situation improves.
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